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MBFR negotiations in Vienna 
1. Adopted in Committee by 9 votes to 0 with 8 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chair-
man) ; Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens, 
Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettiol, Mrs. von Bothmer, 
MM. Brugnon (Substitute : Forni), Cermolacce, Fioret, 
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Fletcher, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute : de Broym), 
MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, 
Peijnenburg, Peridier, Portheine, Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, 
Steel, Urwin, Van Hoeylandt. 
N.B. The names of Representatives who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
- consideration of current problems 
The Assembly, 
Considering that, however Europe's defence may be organised, the Atlantic Alliance remains the 
essential guarantee of European security ; 
Noting with interest the views expressed by the Commission of the European Communities in its 
report on European union of 26th June 1975 concerning the defence responsibilities of the European union; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence respon-
sibilities ; 
Underlining that accession to the modified Brussels Treaty is still open in particular to any country 
ca.lled upon to take part in a European union ; 
Noting that "the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to 
exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty" and that "the Council are at present discussing 
the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the stan-
dardisation of armaments in Europe" (Reply to Recommendation 266); 
Considering the Council's refusal to reply to questions put by members of the Assembly on nuclear 
strategy and NATO defence plans to be contrary to normal parliamentary democratic procedure and conse-
quently unacceptable (Written Questions 158 and 159), 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the 
Assembly, and in particular: 
(a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time 
as the European union has the neceBSary powers and means of action to exercise defence res-
ponsibilities ; 
(b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions 
of the union ; 
2. Ensure that no member country enters into any international undertaking liable to limit its parti-
cipation in a European union with responsibilities covering external policy and defence matters ; 
3. Explore and implement here and now the possibilities afforded by the modified BruBSels Treaty, 
particularly in the field of arms policy ; 
4. Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a. defence policy 
to be implemented by the forces of the member States ; 
5. Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans 
it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur) 
I. Towards an adult Europe 
(i) Closer union 
1. Since the first Prague coup in 1947, and 
above all since the signing of the Atlantic 
Alliance in 1949, soon followed by the Warsaw 
Pact, free Europe has lived in the shadow of 
the two blocs under the balance of terror. While 
belonging to one of these blocs, Western Europe 
(in the geographical sense extending beyond the 
seven members of WEU) sought in varying 
degrees but untiringly to define its own identity 
and promote the union. The Council of Europe 
(or greater Europe), Western European Union 
which replaced the stillborn European Defence 
Community, and the European Economic Com-
munity each in turn provided the appropriate 
framework. 
2. Although the first two have stood still while 
continuing a steady dialogue and collaboration 
between their members in their own specific 
fields, it has become increasingly clear since the 
summit meetings in The Hague, Copenhagen and 
Paris that the Economic Community, since 
enlarged to nine, has set a closer union as its 
goal which some believe to be resolutely political 
and defensive but which is discreetly called Euro-
pean, which leaves a wide enough margin for 
future developments. 
(ii) Beyond the two blocs 
3. This emerging Europe, while sheltering 
below the American nuclear umbrella, quickly 
understood that it had to move cautiously and 
gradually extend beyond the two blocs to create, 
in a shape yet to be defined, a political, economic 
and .~trategic group. The bipolar world of the 
fifties has since become five-fold, if not more, 
since China made its entrance on the world stage 
and Japan has become an economic power to be 
reckoned with. 
4. Today, the outstripping of the blocs is more 
satisfactory than twenty years ago. Following a 
variety of events, the United States has read-
justed its commitments abroad. Here reference is 
made not only to the disturbances caused by the 
tragedy in South-East Asia and the internal 
unrest in that great country but also to the 
effects of the upsurge of the European States 
within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly since 
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1967 : the opening towards the East, policy of 
detente, attempts to achieve balanced force reduc-
tions leading towards the inter-German agree-
ment, the Helsinki agreement and the MBFR 
negotiations. 
5. Further, the Soviet Union's European policy 
seems to have developed towards a more defensive 
concept, having guaranteed the status quo of its 
conquests in Europe, in order to be able more 
easily to guard the Asian front. Or such, at 
least, is the general feeling in Europe in spite 
of warnings of caution which are sounded 
regularly. 
(iii) Europe with world-wide responsibilities 
6. The will to outstrip the blocs- which might 
also be called a need for European self-asser-
tion - has been considerably strengthened by 
Europe's vast economic expansion, however 
shaken it may at present be by a dangerous 
depression. An economic community which alone 
represents 20 % of the gross social product of 
the whole world, 41 % of international trade and 
about 50 % of world monetary reserves - an 
economic giant - cannot deny its world respons-
ibilities in establishing peace and social justice. 
With the exception of the United States' posses-
sion of intercontinental nuclear weaponry, 
Europe's responsibilities towards the world as 
a whole and towards the southern hemisphere in 
particular are at least equal to those of the 
United States. Seen from Washington, political 
Europe may seem parochial- according to Mr. 
Ball - because of its mosaic of peoples, nations 
(large and small), languages and national reac-
tions. However this may be, Europe contributes 
generously and without political bias to the 
development of the southern hemisphere and 
shoulders its share of the heavy burden of joint 
defence. 
7. Satisfaction may be derived from the state-
ment by Mr. Ortoli in the European Parliament 
on 18th February 1975 : 
"Europe must behave as an adult and never 
forget that it is a profound moral reality at 
the same time as a great commercial power." 
8. But what Europe is lacking is political 
stature. The major task of our governments is 
to shape this without delay with the enthusiastic 
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support of public opinion in our various 
countries. 
D. Prospects of political union 
9. In a report published in June 1975, the 
Commission of the European Communities out-
lines what a European union might be and 
possible ways of achieving it. 
(i) The proposal 
10. There is a fairly clear picture of the future. 
The Commission (paragraph 3) states that : 
"the possibility of a number of independent 
and parallel organisations must be excluded." 
It also rejects (paragraphs 7 and 8) the type of 
union based on : 
"a network of special agreements involving 
all or only some of the member States 
depending on the subject" 
which it considers contrary to the concept of a 
European identity. 
11. It believes the union's responsibilities should 
include foreign policy and defence policy 
(paragraphs 59, 60 and 61). 
12. Admittedly (paragraph 74) : 
"The Atlantic Alliance plays and will con-
tinue to play a decisive role in the security 
of Western Europe, but the security of the 
union, its long-term cohesion and solidarity 
between its peoples cannot be truly 
guaranteed if defence matters are purely and 
simply left on one side when the union is 
being established." 
13. Moreover (paragraph 87) : 
"In the field of external relations, only a 
single organisation is capable of guarantee-
ing the necessary degree of consistency 
between the various aspects of a policy of 
international co-operation. In addition, it 
would make the union's own personality 
stand out more clearly at international level" 
which, moreover : 
"does not mean that the institutions of the 
union act in all their fields of competence 
in accordance with the same legal rules." 
14. Finally, in paragraph 76, the Commission 
states that for a European defence policy to be 
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considered and accepted by the peoples of the 
union: 
"the European institutions will have to be 
recognised as authoritative and represent-
ative of a sufficiently high degree of solidar-
ity between those peoples." 
Consequently, (paragraph 77) : 
"A period of strengthening the union will be 
necessary before all these conditions can be 
met." 
(if) Fields of competence 
15. These various considerations bring the Com-
mission to consider the field of defence (para-
graph 77) as : 
"a field of potential competence for the 
union, which would thus not be endowed 
with powers and means of action in this field 
from the outset." 
16. The competence and potential competence of 
the union shall be laid down in the act of constitu-
tion (paragraph 12). The member States would 
thus have to enter into an undertaking in 
principle in this field which would have some 
immediate repercussions. Thus, (paragraph 78) : 
".AB a potential competence would be 
involved, the member States would be bound 
not to engage with non-member countries in 
actions which might endanger the security 
of another member State or compromise the 
union's long-term cohesion." 
17. The Commission further suggests (paragraph 
79) : 
"periodic discussions on defence problems 
and the defence effort held in a truly Euro-
pean framework with the participation of 
all the member States'' 
and (paragraph 80) : 
"a systematic comparison of the strategic 
planning of the various countries with the 
aim of arriving at a common view, taking 
account of the specific interests of Europe." 
18. Finally, the Commission recalls the Paris 
communique stating that the European union 
must be set up "with the fullest respect for the 
treaties already signed". It considers that this 
should not be construed to mean that no institu-
tional change is desirable or even necessary but 
that fullest respect for the treaties implies 
(paragraph 93) : 
"that the institutional system of the union 
should be based on the existing institutions." 
(iii) The present situation 
19. There now exists a European Community 
as defined in the EEC, ECSC and Euratom 
treaties. These treaties attribute certain specific 
responsibilities to the Community and conse-
quently to the Commission. In other fields, their 
responsibilities are concurrent with those retained 
by the member States. Lastly, there are potential 
fields of competence, i.e. areas not yet attributed 
to the Community but which are destined to be 
entrusted to it at a time and in conditions which 
are to be the subject of a subsequent decision. 
20. This is the head under which the Commis-
sion's report envisages the future European 
union's defence responsibilities and hence all 
foreign policy questions connected with defence. 
However, drawing on its experience of the Euro-
pean Community, the Commission made the 
following comment (paragraph 22) : 
"In sectors where there were no Community 
instruments or rules, or where they were 
inadequate, governments have not been 
capable on their own of bringing into being 
and maintaining with the necessary con-
tinuity the will to act on their national 
structures and guide development towards 
common objectives." 
21. However, as matters now stand, nine-power 
political consultations have developed outside the 
strict framework of the Community and this 
experience has led the Commission not to retain 
this type of framework for the model European 
union. It states (paragraph 65) : 
"Hitherto, political co-operation has seldom 
led to anything more than the Community 
reacting to events. If these objectives are to 
be achieved, the first thing to be done is to 
complete the elimination of the frequently 
artificial distinction between Community 
activities and matters for political co-opera-
tion. This distinction makes it impossible to 
deal with our problems in context or to act 
as effectively as we should, while our 
partners are faced with a multitude of inter-
locutors none of whom is really in a posi-
tion to speak for Europe. It is not enough 
to try and remedy the situation through 
co-ordination of the two structures. In the 
European union, all questions of common 
interest must be considered in a single 
institutional framework." 
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22. However, the extension of such a framework 
to defence and foreign affairs raises difficulties 
which are underlined by the Commission 
(paragraph 66) : 
"The union would invoke its competence 
only when necessary, so that certain matters 
might, for a very long period and perhaps 
indefinitely, be dealt with solely by the 
member States." 
23. Thus, as the Commission admits (paragraph 
23) : 
"There may be areas which fall within the 
general competence of the union but where 
the union cannot or need not yet be given 
powers of its own. Here it would be useful 
to organise co-operation within the union. 
Such co-operation could, moreover, help to 
promote agreement on certain basic options 
and so, in appropriate fields, lead at a later 
stage to the union being given powers of its 
own." 
(iu) The aims 
24. The Commission's aims in the fields of 
foreign affairs and defence are thus defined 
(paragraph 63) : 
"The general political aspects of interna-
tional relations are dealt with under the 
system of political co-operation established 
between the nine member States of the Com-
munity. 
Matters relating specifically to defence are 
dealt with at NATO and in Western Euro-
pean Union. 
These various forms of collaboration will 
have to be organised coherently and given 
a new dimension in the union." 
And (paragraph 66) : 
"As regards the distribution of fields of 
competence between the union and the 
member States, the final objective is a com-
mon policy with direct attribution of powers 
to the union institutions in all areas where 
the member States acting alone cannot have 
as effective a voice as would the union acting 
as one, or where the absence of a common 
policy would make it impossible for the 
union to pursue the objectives of its internal 
development or to contribute to internatio-
nal actions of interest to the union." 
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m. European defence 
(i) A question evaded for too long 
25. The question of European defence underlies 
all discussions on European union and the cohe-
sion of the Atlantic Alliance. But the roots of 
the question are rarely tackled whether by the 
European countries or in the Atlantic Alliance. 
The question is possibly evaded for two reasons : 
because it might elicit doubts about the sincerity 
of the adhesion of the European countries to the 
Atlantic Alliance and because for Europe to have 
a defence system of its own might eventually 
lead to a political organisation completely inde-
pendent of the United States. 
26. In 1973, Mr. Jobert, then French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, had the courage to raise 
the problem in the WEU Assembly. At the time, 
his speech evoked reservations in many Euro-
pean capitals not because of the hint of Euro-
pean self-assertion but because of fears of opening 
the door to an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. 
There has since been no mention of the subject, 
at least officially, but it is still obviously a 
topical matter and WEU is the appropriate 
framework for discussing it. 
27. European defence is indubitably a matter 
for the European union which the Nine have 
set as an objective, as they affirmed at the 
summit meeting in Paris in December 1974. There 
can be no question of political unification, even 
limited to loose, flexible confederal links, if a 
start is not made on integrating the means of 
defence. Some independent integrated defence 
capability is, moreover, the firmest guarantee for 
a clearly distinguished political entity. 
(if) Faithfulness to the Atlantic Alliance 
28. What is also mandatory is that the imple-
mentation of the joint defence system for nine-
power Europe cannot weaken the Atlantic 
Alliance but should strengthen it. 
29. Is it necessary to recall the solemn declara-
tion in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 in which the 
nine governments affirmed that there was no 
alternative to the security afforded by the nuclear 
armament of the United States and the presence 
of American troops on our continent Y As far as 
is known, none of the members of WEU expres-
sed reservations in endorsing the Ottawa declara-
tion. 
30. In preparing to integrate their means of 
defence, the Nine must clearly confirm that they 
remain faithful to the Alliance, particu]arly since 
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this will afford them protection from disagree-
able surprises during the process of progressive 
integration. 
31. Should it eventually be possible to achieve 
the ]Jlilitary integration of the Nine, it will be 
just as essential to maintain the Alliance for 
obvious geographic and military reasons. The 
fact is that the area covered by the Nine is 
Jacking in depth, is too drawn out geographically 
and, above all, there is such an enormous differ-
ence between the Franco-British nuclear arsenal 
and that of the USSR that the United States 
nuclear guarantee will still be essential. 
32. It has been said that joint European defence 
might disturb the Soviet Union and thus 
endanger the policy of detente. It is clear that 
the Soviet Union has always frowned upon any 
form of European unification, even the Common 
Market. But in all honesty it cannot feel 
threatened by a political and military change 
which, although strengthening the defensive cohe-
sion of the Alliance, changes practically nothing 
in the ratio of forces. 
33. Incidentally, it should be underlined that 
the EEC Commission in its report of 25th June 
1975 sees defence as a potential competence of 
the European union, while affirming that this 
defence must be placed in the Atlantic frame-
work. 
(iii) A first firm step 
34. Over and above the studies and discussion 
which will arise, some definite progress must be 
made without delay. This calls to mind the views 
expressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs - inter alia in the WEU Assembly on 
5th December 1974 and 28th May 1975 - on 
a joint armaments and materiel policy. This 
would be a small but essential step. A European 
defence system will be possible only insofar as 
Europe has an independent arms and materiel 
production capability. This implies first a joint 
approach and second a reshaping of the arma-
ments industries which moreover would improve 
the chances where trade with the United States 
and Canada is concerned. 
35. At a future European Council meeting, it is 
therefore important to work out a truly Euro-
pean defence concept which takes account of the 
requirements of the Atlantic Alliance. 
(iv) The deterrent 
36. A European union fully competent in defence 
matters cannot exclude the possibility of having 
its own strategic and tactical nuclear arms, at 
least in the long run. Public opinion's aversion 
to this weapon of destruction in our different 
countries is acknowledged. But today there can 
be no effective defence without the deterrent and 
the European union would be a third class poli-
tical force if it excluded for ever the possibility 
of ensuring its own defence by nuclear means. 
37. Countries such as France and the United 
Kingdom (whose political and economic power 
cannot be compared with that of the United 
States and the USSR) provided themselves with 
independent nuclear means because they con-
sidered they could not lower their guard in the 
absence of an effective world-wide organisation 
which could ban or limit nuclear weapons. A 
political confederation which included these two 
countries and which inherited French and 
British nuclear weapons would automatically 
become a nuclear power. It is inconceivable for 
these two countries to agree to join a European 
political union which eliminated the deterrent. 
On the other hand, it is equally inconceivable for 
the nuclear arms the European union would 
inherit to remain exclusively under French and 
British command, at least in the final stage of 
the union. After a period of transition, the 
French and British deterrents should therefore 
take their place in a European defence system 
capable of defining its own strategy. To those who 
morally might not be able to subscribe to this the 
following question might be put : what distinction 
is there between nuclear defence ensured by the 
United States and European nuclear defence, 
other than a thin coating of hypocrisy ? The 
only valid argument is the high cost of nuclear 
means, but it is evident that, as with French or 
British nuclear defence systems, the European 
union's strategy would never go further than 
what is strictly necessary to deter a possible 
enemy. 
38. For the time being and as long as the United 
States is firmly committed in the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance to applying a joint 
strategy which meets in full the defence require-
ments of Western Europe, the organisation of a 
European strike force is not an immediate 
necessity. But now is the time to prepare for the 
future particularly if it were to transpire that 
NATO could not indefinitely remain Western 
Europe's only resort for its security. 
IV. WEU's r6le in the interim period 
39. As the formation of a European union will 
certainly be a long drawn out task, it will be 
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necessary to preserve what now exists in the field 
of defence and political co-operation and also 
to make WEU's mission converge with that of 
the future European union in which WEU will 
eventually be absorbed. 
(i) Preserving what exists 
40. It should be recalled that the Brussels Treaty 
is a treaty of alliance with wide-ranging com-
mitments, which, if diluted, would have most 
serious repercussions on the security of Europe. 
Conversely, there are certain discriminatory 
aspects to this treaty which cause the govern-
ments of several member countries to accept it 
only with reluctance. This is the case for 
Germany, because of the bans imposed on it, the 
United Kingdom, because of the commitment to 
maintain a large force on the continent of 
Europe, and the other countries of continental 
Europe which have to submit to verification of 
their forces as a whole. 
41. However this may be, in the end all the 
members of WEU are affected by these discrimin-
atory clauses which consequently are not really 
discriminatory but are rather concessions from 
which each country draws some advantage. To 
renounce the treaty or even its discriminatory 
clauses - which would mean calling in question 
the work of the treaty as a whole - would put 
an end to the only instrument which exists for 
preparing the European union in the field of 
defence and foreign policy. 
42. However, the application of the treaty is 
proving to be hardly satisfactory at the moment 
because the Council is no longer meeting at 
ministerial level and, whatever it may claim, the 
Council at ambassadorial level is taking absolutely 
no initiative, even in WEU's own specific field. 
Thu.q, in reply to Written Questions 158 and 159, 
the WEU Council said that these questions : 
"relate to recent developments in the United 
States' nuclear strategy and their conse-
quences for NATO defence planning. The 
Council are not in a position to appraise 
these matters." 
43. Such a position is contrary to all the 
Council's commitments to the Assembly and, 
because of its implications, helps to weaken the 
prospects of European union in the form 
envisaged by the Commission of the Communities. 
It should further be recalled that the WEU 
Council was itself set up under the Brussels 
Treaty and to allow it to become dormant would 
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be making the treaty dormant, which would be 
tantamount to abandoning one of the essential 
foundations of European union. 
44. Some ground has also been gained bilaterally 
and this must be preserved and extended insofar 
as possible. Most characteristic of this is possibly 
the Franco-German treaty with the compulsory 
and detailed consultations it has introduced. 
Although this treaty may not have produced 
identity of views between France and Germany 
on many essential matters, it has at least allowed 
these two countries to hold regular detailed 
consultations on all the matters which interest 
them, and particularly those affecting foreign 
policy and defence. This could serve as a model 
for the future European union. 
(if) Preparing the European union 
45. WEU can also offer a number of instru-
ments for preparing this union, the first being 
the Standing Armaments Committee, referring 
to which the Council recalled, in reply to Recom-
mendation 266, that 
"the Council are at present discussing the 
possibility that Western European Union 
might undertake additional work connected 
with the standardisation of armaments in 
Europe." 
46. This reply, to which the seven member 
governments subscribed, seems to meet the con-
cerns expressed by the EEC Commission in 
paragraph 81 of its report : 
"Another major step forward would be the 
development of a common policy on arms and· 
equipment, possibly involving the setting up 
of a "European Arms Agency", which would 
bring about a more rational use of available 
funds and the industrial and technological 
potential of the member States. Experience 
has shown that the lack of a common policy 
in this field has meant that a number of 
industries are excessively dependent on 
sources outside the Community. 
This situation not only adversely affects the 
production of military equipment, and hence 
Europe's scope for independence, but also 
certain non-military industries." 
47. Because of the responsibilities entrusted to 
it under the modified Brussels Treaty, and inso-
far as the activities of both the Agency and the 
Standing Armaments Committee are closely 
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supervised by the WEU Council, the latter con-
tinues to have an important role to play in 
preparing for a European union which would 
include these activities and it should be recalled, 
as the Assembly has done on many occasions, that 
WEU is not a closed shop but meets the wish 
of the EEC Commission as expressed in para-
graph 10 of its report which recalls that the 
European union must : 
"be open to the accession of other European 
countries which have a democratic pluralist 
political system and are able to assume the 
burdens and responsibilities that go with 
membership of the union. It seems reason-
able that the conditions for the accession of 
such countries should be similar in character 
to those set out in the present treaties, one of 
which is the unanimous agreement of the 
member States." 
48. One of the main roles of the WEU Council 
would also be to meet the view contained in 
paragraph 18 of the report of the Commission 
that member States : 
"would clearly be bound, once the union was 
established, to refrain from any action which 
in the long term could jeopardise the union's 
exercise of its competence." 
49. Regarding procedure, the Council, in its own 
particular field and during the interim period in 
which this task would be entrusted to it, might 
play the role which the Commission assigns to 
the institutions of the union which (paragraph 
73) 
"will have the task of preparing and imple-
menting joint positions and actions." 
This would correspond to a proposal which has 
already been made on many occasions by the 
WEU Assembly but which the Council has never 
taken into account. 
50. Finally, by virtue of the amended Brussels 
Treaty, the WEU Assembly still has respons-
ibilities pursuant to the application of the Brussels 
Treaty, i.e. the activities of the Council, the 
Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee. 
If it is desirable for these duties to be transferred 
one day to a true European parliament, it is 
essential for the WEU Assembly to continue to 
exercise its duties as long as the parliament of 
the . European union has not been officially 
entrusted with the responsibilities incumbent 
upon the WEU Assembly by virtue of the 
Brussels Treaty. 
(iii) The WEU Assembly's duty 
51. Insofar as it is considered, as set out 
explicitly by the EEC Commission in paragraph 
2 of its report, that WEU is the present expres-
sion of Europe in foreign policy and defence 
matters, the policy pursued by the governments 
in the framework of the WEU Council must 
correspond to that defined by the Commission 
for the future European Community. In the 
twenty years of its existence, the Council has 
seen the exercise of its cultural and social activ-
ities handed over to the Council of Europe and 
political consultations and the co-ordination of 
member States' policies in the United Nations 
and specialised world agencies transferred to 
nine-power consultations. 'rhis was probably very 
reasonable. But at a time when the joint activ-
ities of the Nine are to be reviewed, the Council 
should at least keep in close touch with the EEC 
bodies exercising responsibilities falling within 
its purview. 
52. Several times the Assembly has recom-
mended that the WEU Council, pending a true 
nine-power political union, should take over the 
political and defence aspects of Europe and open 
its doors to the Common Market countries which 
are not members of WEU. 
53. Since the European Council, as the result of 
several decisions reached at summit meetings, is 
in the process of becoming the nucleus of the 
European union, WEU's main ambition should 
be to play its full role in the interim period 
until the treaty of the union is ratified and its 
institutions established. The achievement of the 
union will moreover be facilitated by regular 
discussions on defence problems in a purely 
European framework as recalled in the resolution 
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 11th 
September 1975. 
54. The WEU Assembly cannot give up its com-
pelling commitment to impress upon the Council, 
which is too often indifferent, the need to make 
full use of the possibilities afforded by the 
Brussels Treaty with an eye to the future Euro-
pean union. 
V. Evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
(i) The threshold of a third stage ? 
55. The first twenty-six years of the Atlantic 
Alliance may be roughly divided into two stages : 
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(a) from the beginning until December 1967, 
when the West's defence system was 
being set up against the military giant 
in the East for, as Mr. Spaak said, "we 
were afraid". During the first fifteen 
years, NATO made this fear recede and 
even disappear ; 
(b) from December 1967 until the Helsinki 
conference in July 1975, following the 
Harmel report on the future tasks of the 
Alliance, a policy of detente replaced 
the cold war. 
56. The main question now is : will the CSCE 
introduce a third stage, that of entente in the 
part of the world which includes Alaska and 
Vladivostok, since, because of the Helsinki agree-
ments, security and co-operation in Europe 
include the whole northern area of the globe Y 
57. If this is so, Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals might gradually break away from the 
fixed role in which it provides two banks, each 
of which is used as a military base by one of 
the two superpowers. 
58. The stage of the two' blocs must be left 
still further behind. Even if the division of the 
old continent into two well-defined areas - East 
and West - continues, the military alliances of 
both sides will probably be affected, particularly 
if the MBFR talks are successful and SALT II, 
which may be considered as the cornerstone of 
detente, avoids the vague and general provisions 
of SALT I in 1972. 
59. How will the Atlantic Alliance evolve during 
this third stage 7 The form proposed by Presi-
dent Kennedy in 1971, i.e. an Alliance based on 
two pillars, one on each side of the Atlantic, has 
not been achieved. The Alliance is still under the 
hegemony of the United States but responsibility 
for this also rests with the Western Europeans 
who, in a quarter of a century, have been unable 
to agree on a form of political unification or on 
a joint defence concept. 
60. In recent years, there have been vast changes 
in the international situation, mainly through the 
development of relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The two great 
powers first sought shelter from nuclear war, on 
the one hand by technical negotiations on the use 
of nuclear weapons and on the other by intensify-
ing consultations on all world problems. Follow-
ing the agreement reached in the framework of 
the CSCE, the SALT negotiations might lead to 
a second agreement, whereas the MBFR talks 
have resumed after a long period of marking time. 
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61. There has been a sharp drop in East-West 
tension, in which the Atlantic Alliance was born, 
and the emergence of a spirit of detente has 
transformed the nature of relations between the 
members of NATO and has roused a section of 
public opinion against the military paternalism 
of the United States. 
62. Moreover, there have been a number of 
internal problems in the Atlantic Alliance. 
France's withdrawal from the integrated military 
structure is no longer so serious as it was a few 
years ago since relations between France and its 
partners in defence matters have been organised 
on a new basis. However, the development of 
French nuclear weapons - particularly tactical 
weapon.'! - has aroused new problems between 
France and its neighbours. 
63. The yet uncertain direction of developments 
in Portugal raises serious problems for the 
Alliance as a whole, for the Azores constitute a 
bridge between the United States and Europe. 
64. In summer 197 4, there was a serious crisis 
in relations between Greece and Turkey which is 
still far from a solution and which considerably 
weakened the Alliance's defence capabilities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
65. Finally, the bilateral agreements between the 
United States and Spain also concern the Euro-
pean members of the Alliance. 
66. It is manifest from these various factors that 
the Atlantic Alliance depends more than ever on 
the United States now that United States security 
seems to depend less on the Alliance than on 
its direct relations with the Soviet Union. 
Admittedly, Europe is still an essential part of 
American defence policy, as President Ford 
confirmed in Bl'USsels earlier this year, but it 
t~nds to take second place to direct relations 
between the United Staw,s and the Soviet Union. 
(ii) A strategy which meets Europe's requirements 
67. The initial doctrine on which Western 
Europe's defence was based was that of massive 
retaliation, which meant that the United States 
would intervene with its full strategic nuclear 
force against any power invading Western 
Europe. But as Soviet nuclear strength developed, 
Europeans and Americans began to wonder 
whether it was conceivable for the United States 
to run the risk of a nuclear exchange which 
would destroy its own territory for the sole 
purpose of defending its allies, however important 
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it might consider the civilisation or economic 
and commercial strength of Europe. 
68. NATO thus had to make a major effort in 
the sLxties to build up sufficient conventional 
forces to meet a possible attack without neces-
sarily leading to a nuclear exchange and 
American forces in Europe were armed with 
tactical nuclear weapons intended to raise a 
second screen in front of the strategic deterrent 
of the United States. A number of these weapons 
were subsequently made available to the armed 
forces of several NATO member countries under 
a two-key system which made those concerned 
even more dependent on the strategy defined in 
Washington. 
69. The aim of this new strategy of flexible 
response was to allow the .Americans, on the 
territory of mainland Europe and with the 
assistance of their European allies, to meet any 
attack and at the same time still retain the 
possibility of negotiating in order to avoid 
recourse to strategic nuclear weapons which 
might result in mass destruction on their own 
territory. However rational from the American 
point of view, a serious drawback of this strategy 
is that it might make Europe a battlefield in 
which conventional weapons might be used - in 
themselves capable of wreaking considerable 
havoc - or so-called tactical nuclear weapons 
which even so would be capable of completely 
destroying the densely-populated territory of 
Western Europe. 
70. This strategy, implying the possibility of war 
being waged on European territory, was 
distasteful to the European nations but, lacking 
adequate strength of their own, they had to bow 
to the strategic wishes of the United States for 
fear lest the Americans should abandon Europe. 
71. Everything indicates that, as matters now 
stand, for lack of a union Europe will have to 
accept this situation. American opinion, keenly 
aware of the importance which Western Europe 
attaches to the presence of American forces on its 
territory as a guarantee of American deterrence, 
is exerting growing pressure on the United States 
Government to use the threat of withdrawing 
its forces in order to induce Europeans to 
adapt their own forces to the requirements of 
American strategy. Moreover, the European 
countries have progressively relaxed their defence 
effort as "fear" receded, whilst at the same time 
relying on the strength of the United States. 
72. Since European forces are deployed in a 
NATO framework to implement a strategy about 
which European public opinion knows very little 
and likes even less, the governments are 
experiencing growing difficulty in making the 
conventional military effort NATO demands. The 
share of the gross national product which most 
\Vestern European countries earmark for defence 
is constantly shrinking and many governments 
are criticised for their defence efforts by some 
sections of public opinion. They are accused of 
jeopardising what is considered more rational 
and urgent action to meet the economic crisis. 
Furthermore, in recent years there have been 
signs of demoralisation in the armies of several 
European countries and servicemen are now no 
longer certain that the defence system of which 
they are a part really serves the security of their 
countries, with the result that they lack con-
fidence in themselves and in the possibility of 
collective defence. 
73. The only strategy to suit Europe is one 
based on massive retaliation. This does not mean 
that Europe need not have conventional forces 
or even tactical nuclear forces. It would be 
unthinkable for Europe to have to resort to 
strategic nuclear weapons in order to meet a 
minor or limited attack. In that event it would 
be practically powerless in face of such an attack 
and thus incapable of deterring it. But Europe 
cannot lose sight of the essential principle that 
the aim of European strategy must be to deter 
a possible aggressor. It is therefore important to 
restrict the means available to what is absolutely 
essential for meeting a minor attack so that the 
deterrent, i.e. the strategic nuclear force, comes 
into play at the very start of an international 
crisis and precludes the possibility of recourse 
to conventional war or tactical nuclear weapons. 
74. Since it is impossible for Western Europe 
to make such views prevail with the United 
States, the only solution at this stage is to 
maintain NATO as the shield for our security 
and freedom and invite the Americans to prepare 
with us a strategy which meets Europe's vital 
requirements. The chances of this will be enhanced 
if European co-operation is developed in all 
aspects of defence until such time as an effective, 
truly European defence system eventually takes 
over from American military hegemony in 
Western Europe. 
VI. Discussion in Committee 
75. There was a lively and detailed discussion 
on this report at the meeting of the General 
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Affairs Committee in Copenhagen on 23rd Octo-
ber 1975. It was finally adopted by only 9 votes 
to 0 with 8 abstentions. The abstentions were 
directed not so much towards the text of the 
recommendation but stemmed rather from serious 
reservations on the part of certain Committee 
members on several trends followed by your Rap-
porteur. However, not all the reservations were 
of the same nature, nor did they all relate to 
the same points. They must therefore be clas-
sified, account being taken of their impact com-
pared with the report as a whole. 
76. (i) One Committee member considered the 
report to be too biased in favour of the United 
States. Feeling that alliance with the United 
States is still essential for European security, 
he feared that in such an alliance Europe might 
have difficulty in choosing the course to be fol-
lowed in economic and social terms. He also 
thought that the presence of American forces 
was not essential for European security. 
77. (ii) Other Committee members, on the con-
trary, expressed the fear that your Rapporteur 
was underestimating the magnitude of the Soviet 
threat and exaggerating the importance of the 
results of the Helsinki conference. This view 
was qualified by some members who drew a 
distinction between the Soviets' unrelenting 
political aggressivenes.'l and their military aggres-
siveness which appeared to be slackening off to 
some extent, at least in Europe. 
78. (iii) Some members feared that progress 
towards European union might serve to separate 
Europe from the .American guarantee : their 
view was that to extend purely European co-
operation to defence matters would eventually 
weaken NATO. For them, American paternalism 
was not the danger but rather nascent isolation-
ism in the United States. 
79. (iv) Several Committee members expressed 
the wish that the European union should keep 
away from nuclear matters which they con-
sidered should remain the prerogative of the 
superpowers. However, none of them specified 
what should become of French and British 
nuclear weapons in the event of a European 
union being formed in the field of defence. 
80. (v) Other members joined the latter in 
rejecting the concept of massive retaliation, 
preferring the strategy of flexible response, i.e. 
they were satisfied with present American 
thinking. 
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81. (vi) Some members found the Rapporteur 
had not taken due account of the new possibil-
ities open to nuclear weapons since the sea now 
afforded nuclear forces a second strike capability 
which enhanced the deterrent effect of such 
forces. Your Rapporteur is quite prepared to 
accept this criticism, although he does not feel 
it has any great effect on his line of thought. 
82. (vii) Your Rapporteur was criticised for 
using the word hegemony in defining the special 
position of the United States in the Alliance. 
Your Rapporteur attaches no derogatory mean-
ing to this word, which he considers perfectly 
appropriate to the present situation in the 
Alliance. There is no denying that the United 
States plays a primordial role, demonstrated by 
the fact that it is responsible for appointing 
the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces. 
Is this not the very role which, since the days of 
ancient Greece, gives a very precise meaning to 
the word hegemony ? 
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83. (viii) Some Committee members considered 
that political union was not at all a preliminary 
to joint European defence but could only be 
the result. Others felt a debate on European 
defence was not expedient at this stage. 
84. (ix) One Committee member underlined that 
any progress towards European union required 
prior strengthening of the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament and its election by universal 
suffrage. 
85. (x) Another Committee member was anxious 
to avoid any conclusion which sought to streng-
then WEU. 
86. Since your Rapporteur has set out his own 
ideas on these various points in earlier chapters, 
in what he hopes are measured but unambiguous 
terms, he feels there is no call to enter into 
further controversy here and trusts he has 
managed to sum up in a generally-acceptable 
manner the views put to him in Committee. 
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APPENDIX 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna 
The negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) (covering the terri-
tories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg) began in Vienna on 30th October 
1973. The participants are all seven of the 
Warsaw Pact States and twelve of the fifteen 
NATO nations (France, Iceland, Portugal are 
not negotiating). The allied negotiators in 
Vienna are bound, on questions of policy and 
strategy, by guidance elaborated in the NATO 
Council. 
The main elements of the western position 
are: 
1. The overall result of MBFR should be a 
common ceiling on ground force manpower of 
both sides in the area of reductions of approxi-
mately 700,000 men on each side, in order to 
correct the existing disparity in ground force 
manpower between the two sides in the area 
(ca. 925,000 WP men to NATO's approximately 
777,000 ; 15,500 WP main battle tanks in active 
units to NATO's 6,000). 
2. There should be no separate national ceil-
ings on individual States since this would 
inhibit force rearrangement within the area of 
reductions and give the WP a droit de regard 
over NATO's internal affairs. 
3. The common ceiling should be reached in 
two phases; in the first phase only United 
States and Soviet forces would be withdrawn 
(a Soviet tank army of five divisions including 
some 68,000 soldiers and 1,700 main battle tanks 
as well as 29,000 United States soldiers) ; in the 
second phase the forces of the remaining direct 
participants (nations with territory or troops in 
the area of reductions) would be addressed. 
The principal elements of the eastern posi-
tion are: 
1. The "existing correlation of forces" (i.e. 
existing imbalance in WP favour) is to be main-
tained; the two sides would reduce first by equal 
amounts and then by equal percentages: specif-
ically, in 1975 the direct participants would 
make a "symbolic" reduction of 20,000 men on 
each side followed in 1976 by a 5 % reduction 
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on each side and in 1977 by a 10 % reduction 
on each side {the East thus opposes the common 
ceiling ; it is interested in imposing national 
ceilings on forces of allied direct participants, 
particularly the Federal Republic of Germany). 
2. .Air and nuclear forces should be included 
in the reductions (both sides agree that naval 
and amphibious forces should not be included). 
3. The two sides should negotiate the reduc-
tion of forces of all direct participants simulta-
neously from the outset (the East rejects the two-
phase concept and is especially interested in 
early reductions in the Bundeswehr). 
In almost two years of hard negotiating, 
there has been no fundamental change in the 
position of either side. The East has advanced 
some procedural, non-substantive rearrangements 
of its basic proposal. In addition, the East at 
one point proposed that all forces in the area 
be frozen prior to reductions. NATO rejected 
this since it would have frozen the very dispar-
ities which the Alliance is attempting to elimi-
nate in these negotiations ; also, thus far, the WP 
has refused to engage in a data exchange, with-
out which a freeze would be highly illusory. For 
its part, NATO has proposed that there be 
separate freezes on the ground and air man-
power of each side between phases to prevent 
possible circumvention. The East has not made 
a definitive response to this proposal. 
The negotiations, which are now in recess, 
are scheduled to resume in Vienna on 26th Sep-
tember. There has been much speculation in the 
press that the Alliance is considering an offer 
to introduce nuclear elements into the negotia-
tions this autumn. There have even been press 
reports in the past few days that the Alliance 
has in fact decided on such an offer. These 
particular reports are speculative and erroneous. 
The allies are continually reviewing the pros-
pects for progress in the MBFR negotiations. 
In this context, several possibilities have been 
examined and remain under consideration. 
However, no decisions of any kind have been 
taken with respect to the possible introduction 
of new proposals in the coming round of nego-
tiations. 
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